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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. : 
PATRICK DEAN COANDO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880546-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Eighth 
District Court, in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, 
denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
made July 9, 1988, at defendant's sentencing hearing. This 
appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and (h) (1971), 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the State's jurisdiction was proper in this 
matter because an essential element of each aspect of defendant's 
offense of issuing bad checks was committed on property within 
the State's jurisdiction? 
2. Whether defendant may properly be considered to be 
an Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction and 
whether Roosevelt, Utah may properly be considered to be part of 
federally recognized Indian Country? 
3. Whether defendant's crimes must be punished as a 
class B misdemeanor at the very minimum? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982): 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 
1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian 
country," as used in this chapter, means (a) 
all land within the limits of any Indian 
reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including 
rights-of-way running through the 
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian 
communities within the boarders of the United 
States whether within the original or 
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and 
whether within or without the limits of a 
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the 
Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running 
through the same. 
18 U.S.C. S 1152 (1982)1 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by 
law, the general laws of the United States as 
to the punishment of offenses committed in 
any place within the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the 
Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses 
committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian, nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country 
who; has been punished by the local law of 
the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty 
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over 
such offenses is or may be secured to the 
Indian tribes respectively. 
18 U.S.C. S 1153 (1982)t 
Any Indian who commits against the person 
or property of another Indian or other person 
any of the following offenses, namely, 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, 
carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, 
who has not attained the age of sixteen 
years, assault with intent to commit rape, 
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incest, assault with intent to commit murder, 
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and larceny, within the 
Indian country, shall be subject to the same 
laws and penalties as all other persons 
committing any of the above offenses, within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
As used in this section, the offenses of 
burglary and incest shall be defined and 
punished in accordance with the laws of the 
State in which such offense was committed as 
are in force at the time of such offense. 
In addition to the offenses of burglary and 
incest, any other of the above offenses which 
are not defined and punished by Federal law 
in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the United States shall be defined and 
punished in accordance with the laws of the 
State in which such offense was committed as 
are in force at the time of such offense. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-201 (1978): 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in 
this state for an offense which he commits, 
while either within or outside the state, by 
his own conduct or that of another for which 
he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) The offense is committed either 
wholly or partly within the state; or 
(b) The conduct outside the state 
constitutes an attempt to commit an 
offense within the state; or 
(c) The conduct outside the state 
constitutes a conspiracy to commit an 
offense within the state and an act in 
furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in 
the state; or 
(d) The conduct within the state 
constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or 
conspiracy to commit in another 
jurisdiction an offense under the laws of 
both this state and such other 
jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within 
this state if either the conduct which is an 
element of the offense, or the result which 
is such an element, occurs within this state. 
In homicide the "result" is either the 
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physical contact which causes death, or the 
death itself; and if the body of a homicide 
victim is found within the state, the death 
shall be presumed to have occurred within the 
state, 
(3) An offense which is based on an omission 
to perform a duty imposed by the law of this 
state is committed within the state 
regardless of the location of the offender at 
the time of the omission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1988) 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a 
check or draft for the payment of money, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying 
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, 
is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person 
who issues a check or draft for which payment 
is refused by the drawee is presumed to know 
the check or draft would not be paid if he 
had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a 
check or draft for the payment of money, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying 
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of 
issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to 
make good and actual payment to the payee in 
the amount of the refused check or draft 
within 14 days of his receiving actual notice 
of the check or draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or 
draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of 
checks or drafts made or drawn in this 
state within a period not exceeding six 
months amounts to a sum of not more than 
$200, such offense shall be a class B 
misdemeanor. 
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(b) If the check or draft or checks or 
drafts made or drawn in this state within 
a period not exceeding six months amounts 
to a sum exceeding $200 but not more than 
$300, such offense shall be a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or 
drafts made or drawn in this state within 
a period not exceeding six months amounts 
to a sum exceeding $300 but not more than 
$1,000, such offense shall be a felony of 
the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or 
drafts made or drawn in this state within 
a period not exceeding six months amounts 
to a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense 
shall be a second degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 26, 1987, defendant was charged with the 
crime of issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1953, as amended) (R. 2). 
Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge on November 23, 
1987, before the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for 
Duchesne County, the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, presiding (R. 
98). Subsequent to the guilty plea, defendant entered into a 
plea in abeyance agreement (R. 99). On April 25, 1988, defendant 
was found to have violated the agreement and a judgement of 
guilty was entered (R. 60-61). At an order to show cause hearing 
held on July 19, 1988, defendant made a motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied and sentence was 
imposed (R. 133-34, 150-51). Notice of appeal by defendant was 
filed on August 5, 1988 (R. 74). 
-5-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An amended information was filed by the Duchesne County 
Attorney in the Seventh Circuit Court of the State of Utah, 
Duchesne County, Roosevelt Department on October 26, 1987, which 
charged defendant with the crime of issuing bad checks, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1953, 
as amended) (R. 2). The crimes were alleged to have been 
committed at Roosevelt, Duchesne County, Utah and Vernal, Uintah 
County, Utah (R. 2). Seven checks were written to the 
establishments of Safeway, Tri-Mart, Vernal Drug, and Triangle 
Oil, at a total amount of $354.26 (R. 2). Defendant pled guilty 
to these charges on November 23, 1987 and an abeyance agreement 
was entered into, under which defendant was to make restitution 
payments and to refrain from any other similar conduct or legal 
violations (R. 87, 98). 
On April 25, 1988, defendant was found to have violated 
the agreement for failure to make the required restitution 
payments and issuing additional bad checks (R. 60-61). 
Subsequently, the plea in abeyance was set aside and judgment was 
entered on the guilty plea (R. 61). 
On July 19, 1988, the Eighth Judicial District Court 
heard an order to show cause why the previously given probation 
should not be revoked and why the sentence previously suspended 
should not be imposed (R. 132). Defendant moved to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that defendant is a Uintah 
Indian and the offenses were committed on the Uintah-Ouray 
Reservation (R. 134-35). Defendant proffered only his own 
testimony in support of his assertions (R. 135). 
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Defendant testified that although his permanent address 
was a post office box in Vernal, Utah, he resided wherever his 
job took him (R. 136). He also testified that he and five other 
Indians have a casing company called F.A.C.S. (R. 137). Further, 
defendant explained that his father is full-blooded Shoshoni 
Indian, his mother is enrolled in the Uintah Band, and defendant, 
himself, was one-fourth shoshoni and three-eighths Uintah Indian 
(R. 137). 
Upon cross-examination, defendant maintained that he 
was a Uintah Indian and that he possessed enrollment cards from 
the Uintah and Wind River (Shoshoni) Reservations (R. 140). 
However, no enrollment cards were produced, or admitted into 
evidence (R. 142, 43). On cross-examination defendant also 
admitted that Vernal Drug is located on State ground (R. 141). 
After hearing defendant's proffers, the Eighth Judicial 
District Court denied defendant's motion, finding that the 
evidence did not support defendant's claim that he is an enrolled 
member of the Ute Indian Tribe (R. 146). Additionally, the court 
noted that some of the bad checks were written on State land and 
all of the checks were drawn on a bank which is not on the 
reservation (R. 146-47). Defendant was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison for a term not to exceed five years (R. 151). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's jurisdiction in this matter was proper 
regardless of defendant's assertion that he is an Indian for 
federal jurisdictional purposes and the offenses occurred in 
Indian Country. Essential elements of each bad check offense 
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that of the drawee's refusal of payment, occurred at the First 
Interstate Bank of Vernal, which is located within the State's 
jurisdiction. Statutory law in Utah and case law in sister 
jurisdictions supports the State's assertion of jurisdiction in 
matters such as the instant case. Thus, this Court need not 
reach the issue of whether defendant is an Indian. 
Alternatively, defendant's proffered evidence failed to 
establish that he is recognized as an Indian for federal criminal 
jurisdiction purposes. His illogical testimony concerning his 
Indian blood heritage and failure to offer credible evidence 
concerning his recognition by the tribe as an Indian support the 
court's conclusion that defendant failed to meet his burden in 
establishing himself as an Indian. The State also reasserts that 
the City of Roosevelt, Utah is not part of the Uintah-Ouray 
Reservation based upon its arguments in the case of State v. 
Perank which are currently under advisement before the Utah 
Supreme Court. The State submits that this Court should at least 
refrain from a determination of the issue until the Supreme Court 
has ruled. 
Finally, if this Court accepts defendant's arguments 
and finds that the State's jurisdiction was improperly exercised 
in this case, the State submits that defendants' criminal acts 
roust at least be punishable by the State as a class B 
misdemeanor. Defendant has pled guilty to issuing these bad 
checks, two of which, totalling $70.00 were passed on state land 
in every element of the offense. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION 
REGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT HE IS 
AN INDIAN AND THE ILLEGAL ACTS TOOK PLACE IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY. 
Defendant's claims that jurisdiction in this matter 
should properly be before the Ute Tribal Court or in an 
appropriate Federal Court is based on his assertions that he is 
an Indian and the crimes took place on an Indian Reservation. 
(See Br. of App. at 4.) However, whether defendant may legally 
be recognized as an Indian and whether certain localities such as 
Roosevelt, Utah are part of Indian Country need not be addressed 
by this Court. Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-1-201 (1978) and 76-6-505 (1988). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1978) directs: 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in 
this state for an offense which he commits, 
while either within or outside the state, by 
his own conduct or that of another for which 
he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) The offense is committed 
either wholly or partly within the 
state; 
(2) An offense is committed partly within 
this state if either the conduct which is an 
element of the offense, or the result which 
is such an element, occurs within this state. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-505 (1988) defines the elements of the 
crime of issuing a bad check or draft as follows: 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a 
check or draft for the payment of money, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying 
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
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rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, 
is guilty of a issuing a bad check or draft. 
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, according to these statutes, the 
State may correctly claim jurisdiction over a charge of issuing 
bad checks if any of the elements of the crime, i.e. (1) passing 
the check; (2) knowing that the check will not be honored; and 
(3) refusal by the drawee to pay, have been committed within the 
State. 
Defendant's guilty plea, entered November 23, 1987, to 
the third degree felony of issuing bad checks in an amount 
exceeding $300 but less than $1,000 (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
505(3)(c) (1988)) is based upon seven checks written to Safeway, 
Tri-Kart, Vernal Drug, and Triangle Oil (R. 2). Although some of 
these establishments are located in Roosevelt (which defendant 
argues is on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservations) (see Brief 
of App. at 5-6), the First Interstate Bank of Vernal, drawee of 
each of these bad checks, is clearly within state jurisdiction 
because Vernal, Uintah County, Utah, is not part of Indian 
Country. Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072, 
1188, aff'd in part, reversed in part, 716 F.2d 1298, on 
rehearing, 773 F.2d 1087, cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986). 
Therefore, although there may be elements of the crime that 
occurred on land arguably part of Indian Country, the element of 
the drawee refusing payment occurred on land that is definitely 
not in Indian country. Accordingly, § 76-1-201 directs that 
defendant is subject to prosecution within the State regardless 
of his assertions that he is an Indian and the checks passed to 
-10-
businesses in Roosevelt, Utah were located on land subject to 
federal jurisdiction. 
In the recent case of State v. Lane, 771 P.2d 1150 
(Wash. 1989), the Supreme Court of Washington considered whether 
the State of Washington had jurisdiction to try three defendants 
on charges of aggravated first degree murder when the victim was 
killed at Fort Lewis, Washington, land held under exclusive 
federal jurisdiction. 771 P.2d at 1151. The court concluded 
that the "State of Washington may exercise jurisdiction over a 
criminal offense if an essential element of the offense occurred 
within the state but outside the land ceded to the federal 
government (where the offense culminated)." Id. at 1152. 
Washington's statutory language mirrors the statutory language of 
Utah previously quoted. Specifically, RCW 9A.04.030(1) (1988) 
states that "[t]he following persons are liable for punishment: 
(1) A person who commits in the state any crime, in whole or in 
part." The court explained that an offense "is committed 'in 
part' in Washington, within the contemplation of the criminal 
jurisdiction statute, when an 'essential element' of the offense 
has been committed here." 771 P.2d at 1153-54; citing, State v. 
Moore, 189 Wash. 680, 690-92, 66 P.2d 836 (1937); State v. 
Swanson, 16 Wash.App. 179, 180, 554 P.2d 364 (1976), review 
denied, 88 Wash.2d 1014, cert, denied, 434 U.S. 967, (1977). 
In the Washington case, the State conceded that "the 
fatal wounds were inflicted, and the victim's death occurred, in 
this area of exclusive federal jurisdiction." 771 P.2d at 1153. 
However, the State asserted that the element of "premeditation" 
• i i -
occurred within the State's jurisdiction, and that this element 
was an essential component of the charge. Ld. The Supreme Court 
of Washington agreed: 
premeditation is an element separate and 
distinct from the specific intent to kill 
required for first degree murder; it also 
distinguishes first degree murder from second 
degree murder. The failure of the state to 
sufficiently establish premeditation has been 
held to require reversal of a conviction for 
aggravated first degree murder. Clearly, 
therefore, premeditation constitutes an 
essential element of the crime of aggravated 
first degree murder. 
It follows from the foregoing, that if the 
State makes a sufficient showing to establish 
that premeditation occurred in this state 
outside Fort Lewis before the infliction of 
the fatal wounds at Fort Lewis, then the 
State of Washington has jurisdiction to try 
petitioners for the crime of aggravated first 
degree murder. 
771 P.2d at 1154-55. In the case at hand, the element of the 
crime of issuing bad checks that the drawee refused payment is 
essential because without the final step of refusal of payment by 
the drawee, the crime of issuing bad checks does not occur. If 
the bank actually made payment, or the establishment never 
tendered the check for payment, an essential element would be 
lacking and the defendant could not be found guilty of the 
offense. 
In the instant case, this essential element of the 
crime was completed. With the First Interstate Bank of Vernal's 
refusal of payment, defendant's offense reached fruition. The 
State's jurisdiction over defendant should be affirmed according 
to S 76-1-201 because this offense was committed "partly within 
the state." For this reason, it is irrelevant whether defendant 
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is an Indian or whether some other elements of the crime occurred 
on the Reservation and this Court need not address either of 
these issues. 
POINT II 
THE STATE PROPERLY ASSERTED ITS JURISDICTION 
OVER DEFENDANT IN THAT THE CRIMES DID NOT 
OCCUR IN INDIAN COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT HAS NOT 
SATISFIED THE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF PROVING HIMSELF AN INDIAN. 
As defendant points out in his brief, whether exclusive 
federal criminal jurisdiction exists depends upon two prongs (See 
Brief of App. at 5.) These prongs are whether the criminal acts 
occurred in "Indian Country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
(1976) and whether defendant may be found to be "Indian" for 
purposes of jurisdiction under federal law. See United States v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262-64 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 
444 U.S. 859 (1980). Defendant failed to establish either of 
these prongs, and, if this court reaches these issues, it may 
still find that jurisdiction was properly asserted by the State. 
A. Roosevelt, Utah IB Not Located In Indian Country. 
This issue has previously been extensively briefed and 
argued in the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clinton Perank, Case 
No. 860196. The Court took Perank under advisement on October 
11, 1988. This Court may wish to refrain from ruling on this 
issue, should it become necessary to address the issue, until the 
Supreme Court has ruled. In any event, Appendix A contains the 
State's argument on this issue in the Perank case. The State 
reasserts the argument in this Court that Roosevelt is not in 
Indian country and incorporates Appendix A as its analysis of the 
issue. 
B. Defendant Failed To Make The Necessary Showing That 
He Is An Indian For Purposes of Exclusive Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction. 
While 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 preclude state 
criminal jurisdiction over "Indians" who commit crimes on Indian 
reservations, defendant cannot avail himself of that defense 
because he did not meet his evidentiary burden to establish that 
he is an Indian. The testimony of defendant at the Order to Show 
Cause Hearing on July 19, 1988 concerning his status as an Indian 
consisted of the following: 
(by Defense) And are you an Indian? 
Yes, I am 
What is your affiliation? 
Q 
A 
Q 
A: My father in [sic] one-half--my father in 
[sic] one full--he is four-fourths Shoshoni 
Indian off the Wind River Reservation, and 
I'm one-fourth Shoshoni off the Wind River 
Reservation. My mother is enrolled in the 
Uintah Band over here on the Ute—what they 
call the Ute Tribe Reservation, but she is in 
the Uintah Band, and so am I. I'm three-
eights Uintah Indian. 
Q: Does the tribe recognize you as a member? 
A: They do. 
(R. 137.) 
This testimony fails to offer any objective proof of 
defendant's recognition by any tribe, such as enrollment cards 
which were never produced or offered into evidence, or the 
testimony of any other tribal members or authorities. Further, 
defendant's testimony is internally inaccurate and is, therefore, 
incredible. Defendant testified that his father is full-blooded 
Shoshoni Indian, yet defendant states he is only one-fourth 
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Shoshoni. He also states that he is three-eighths Uintah Indian. 
Presumably this would make defendant's mother three-quarters 
Uintah Indian and leave her one-quarter unknown to this court. 
If defendant's father is, in fact, full-blooded Shoshoni and his 
mother is three-quarters Uintah and one-quarter unknown, 
defendant should logically be one-half Shoshoni, three-eighths 
Uintah and one-eighth unknown. However, defendant's incredible 
assertions are that he is one-quarter Shoshoni, three-eighths 
Uintah, leaving another three-eighths unknown. By his 
description, his largest tribal claim by blood, the Shoshoni 
tribe, has become the smallest blood connection. 
Aside from these inaccuracies, defendant only asserted 
that "the tribe" recognized him as a member. He did not specify 
which tribe he was referring to. Surely, defendant cannot claim 
that because the Shoshoni tribe recognizes him, the Ute Tribe has 
jurisdiction over his actions on the Ute Reservation. When 
defendant was asked by the court if he had any further evidence 
or testimony to present, he simply reasserted his position that 
"the facts state for themselves [defendant] is a member of the 
Uintah Band, that the incidents alleged took place on the 
reservation, and that according to federal Indian law the court 
is without jurisdiction." (R. 143). He did not present a Wind 
River enrollment card even though he earlier stated that he had 
such a card with him. Nor did he present a Ute enrollment card. 
That evidence does not qualify defendant as an Indian 
for purposes of avoiding state jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1152 and 1153. As a preeminent authority on Indian law has 
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stated: "Several important Indian statutes, such as the federal 
criminal jurisdiction statutes [citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 
1153] . . . use the word "Indian" without further definition. . . 
[T]he courts have taken the position in this situation that 
the term 'Indian' means an individual who has Indian blood and 
who is regarded as an Indian by his or her tribe or Indian 
community." F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 24 (1982 
ed.) (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). Defendant's 
evidence leaves in doubt his status vis-a-vis the Tribe. 
"Tribal membership as determined by the Indian tribe or 
community itself is often an essential element. In fact, a 
person of complete Indian ancestry who has never had relations 
with any Indian tribe may be considered a non-Indian for some 
legal purposes." Ld. at 19 (footnote omitted). "Some people 
therefore can be an Indian for one purpose but not for another." 
Id. at 26. And Cohen specifies that one who is an "Indian" for 
some purposes may not necessarily qualify to avoid state criminal 
jurisdiction. Id. 
"[T]wo elements must be satisfied before it can be 
found that the appellant is an Indian under federal law. . . [He 
must have] a significant percentage of Indian blood . . . [and 
he] must be recognized as an Indian either by the federal 
government or by some tribe or society of Indians." Goforth v. 
Oklahoma, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla.Crim.App. 1982). In that case, 
"[t]he record [was] devoid . . . of any evidence tending to show 
that the appellant was recognized as an Indian. Absent such 
recognition, we cannot hold that [he] is an Indian under federal 
law . . . ." Ld. Since the appellant was not an Indian under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153# those statutes did not preempt state 
jurisdiction. Id. 
Having failed to establish the nature and extent of any 
relationship he may have with the tribe, defendant in this case 
also has not shown that he is an Indian. Utah's jurisdiction 
therefore was not preempted. iCf. New Mexico v. Cutnose, 532 
P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct.App. 1974) ("The jurisdictional challenge 
was to a court exercising general jurisdiction. . . . The burden 
was upon defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the 
district court.") Since he sought to invoke a special exception 
to the State's jurisdiction, he was the moving party and had the 
burden of producing prima facie evidence that he is an Indian. 
Such facts were peculiarly available to defendant. He, 
far more easily than the State, could produce evidence of his 
tribal relations. Indeed, the State otherwise would have to try 
to prove a negative (i.e., that defendant is not an Indian), and 
would have to meet that difficult burden in more or less an 
evidentiary vacuum, on nothing more than the defendant's bald 
allegation. Defendant, had the burden of going torward with 
sufficient evidence to show prima facie that he is an Indian. 
"The party who asserts a fact has the burden t 
es t. ab 1 J sh t hf» I acf " Yeazell v. Copins , 98 A M Z . 1 09 J P 2d 
541, 546 (1965). "The ordinary rule, based on considerations of 
fairness, does not place the burden upo* litigant to establish 
facts pecul I airly wi tl i i i i 1:1 :ie ki iow] e< . \ -• adversary. " United 
States v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 
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(1957); Browzin v. Catholic University, 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975). In other words, "the party in the best position to 
present the requisite evidence should bear the burden of proof . 
. .," United States v. Continental Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962, 964 
(11th Cir. 1985), and "[t]he party with the best knowledge 
normally sustains the burden." Lindahl v. Office of Personnel 
Management, 776 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
If defendant did not have the burden of production, the 
State would have the extreme burden of proving a negative, which 
burden the law does not favor. Trans-American Van Service v. 
U.S., 421 F.Supp. 308, 331 (N.D. Tex. 1976). And the State would 
have to prove that negative without the defendant's having to 
make any evidentiary showing whatever. "In that situation it 
would not make too much sense to thrust upon the [State] the 
burden of disproving the truth of the bare [allegation]." 
Lindahl, 776 F.2d at 780. 
United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1983), 
illustrates the principle that a criminal defendant has the 
initial burden on whether or not he is an Indian. That case, 
like the instant one, involved 18 U.S.C. S 1152. Hester argued 
against federal jurisdiction because the statute's coverage does 
"not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against . . . 
another Indian" and the indictment had not alleged Hester's non-
Indian status. Iji. at 1042. 
The Government argued that it did not have the "burden 
of alleging and establishing the non-applicability of this 
exception to S 1152.M Id. The court agreed, citing, McKelvey v. 
-18-
United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) ("it is incumbent on one 
who relies on such an exception to set it up and establish it"). 
As the court correctly noted, "It is far more manageable for the 
defendant to shoulder the burden of producing evidence that he is 
a member of a federally recognized tribe than it is for the 
Government to produce evidence that he is not. ..." Iji. at 719 
F.2d 1043. The Government does not have "the burden of going 
forward on that issue." Id. 
Similar analysis, although under a different (civil) 
statute, prevailed in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 
F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). The 
court held against the tribe's position on burden of proof, in 
part because the tribe's opponent otherwise would "have to try to 
prove a negative." Jd. at 590. 
In this case, defendant is the party who would benefit 
from proof that he is an Indian, and he therefore has the burden 
of establishing that fact. In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 
560 F.Supp. 1006, 1008 (N.D. Ga. 1982). We acknowledge that the 
State ultimately has the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3), but that does not alter 
defendant's burden of producing evidence in the first instance to 
2 
establish prima facie that he is an Indian. If he meets the 
Section 76-1-501(3) states: "The existence of jurisdiction and 
venue are not elements of the offense but shall be established by 
a preponderance of the evidence." 
2 
That the State has the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction 
does not necessarily mean it has the burden of going forward on 
that issue. Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc. 537 F.Supp. 730, 
735 (N.D. Va. 1982). Section 76-1-501(3) leaves it to the court 
to delineate whose burden it is to go forward with evidence in a 
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burden, "then the ultimate burden of proof remains, of course, 
upon the Government." Hester, 719 F.2d at 1043. 
The State did not have the burden of refuting 
defendant's "Indian-status" allegation until he had given it a 
full prima facie basis in fact. And the record shows defendant 
failed to present evidence on all facts necessary to make a prima 
facie showing. 
POINT III 
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT ACCEPTS DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIMS THAT THE OFFENSE OCCURRED IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN FOR 
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES, THE PROPER 
REMEDY IS TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR. 
Initially, the State reasserts it's position that the 
State's jurisdiction was proper in the instant case because an 
essential element of each illegally passed check occurred in 
Vernal, Utah, which is off of the reservation. Alternatively, 
the State maintains that no elements of the offense occurred in 
Indian Country and defendant has not established himself as an 
Indian for purposes of federal jurisdiction. However, if this 
court accepts defendant's claims, defendant's offense of issuing 
bad checks, to which he entered a guilty plea on November 23, 
2 
Cont. particular case, and that burden may shift with the 
circumstances. "[T]here is not and cannot be any one general 
solvent for [allocating] the burden of proof in all cases. It is 
merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in 
the different situations." Mashpee Tribe, 592 F.2d at 589 n.13, 
quoting, 9 Wigmore on Evidence, S 2486, p, 274 (3d ed. 1940) 
(bracketed word in the court's opinion). In some cases, the 
State may have the burden of production as well as the burden of 
persuasion, but not here. Fairness and efficiency require that 
the Indian criminal defendant have the burden of production on 
his Indian status. 
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1987, should be punished as a class B misdemeanor. Two checks, 
one for $20 and one for $50, were passed to Vernal Drug (R. 2). 
This establishment, as defendant admits, is not located on the 
reservation. (See Brief of App. at 5-6.) Therefore, according 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-201 and 76-6-505, the State's assertion 
of jurisdiction over the offenses committed in Vernal, Utah is 
proper and defendant should be punished for the commission of a 
class B misdemeanor at the very least. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to uphold the jurisdiction of the District Court and affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^ *A day of June, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
/ SANDRA h< ^ SJOGREN 
/ / Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
Basin. And finally, given the state of the record, it cannot be 
said that Perank's status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections 
1152 and 1153 was not established below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OFFENSE WAS WOT COMMITTED WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY 
AND THE STATE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
Perank claims his crime was committed within Indian country 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151, and that—coupled with the allega-
tion that he is an Indian—deprived the state district court of 
jurisdiction. The following section of this brief will demon-
strate that the crime did not take place within Indian country 
because the original Uintah reservation has been disestablished 
and today consists only of "trust lands,99 and Perank9s offense 
was committed outside those trust lands. We first examine the 
principles established by the United States Supreme Court for 
determining whether a reservation has been disestablished. This 
is followed by an examination of the legislation and facts and 
circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation 
which show that it has been disestablished. 
A. General Principles Governing Disestablishment 
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263), 
as amended, a Presidential Proclamation Issued on July 14, 1905 
(34 Stat. 3119), providing that all the unallotted and unreserved 
lands of the original Uintah reservation were restored to the 
public domain and opened for public settlement under the home-
stead and townslte laws. It is settled law that some surplus 
land acts diminished reservations, see, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe 
v, Knelp, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)f and DeCoteau v. Dlatrict County 
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and other aurplua land acta did not, 
•ee, e.qf, Mattr v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), and Seymour v, 
Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). Solem, 465 U.S. at 468-69. 
Aa explained in Solem, the Supreme Court has eatabliahed a "fair-
ly clean analytical etructure" for diatinguiahing those aurplus 
land acta that of their ovn force effected an immediate diminish-
ment of the reaervation from thoae acta that aimply permitted 
non-Indians to purchaae land within an exiating reservation and 
left to another day the actual redrawing of its boundaries (id. 
at 470). Because Appellant does no more than submit the decision 
of the en banc majority to support his contention that the crime 
took place in Indian country, ve Bust examine that decision in 
light of controlling Supreme Court precedents. 
1. The £n banc majorityfs decision in Ute Indian Tribe that 
the hiatoric reservations were not disestablished ultimately 
reata on the proposition that restoration to public domain Ian* 
guage ia not the same as a congreasional state of mind to dises-
tabliah and does not reliably eatablish the clear and uneqpjivocal 
evidence of Congress1 intent to change boundaries. In so hold* 
ing, the majority acknowledged that this had not been the law 
prior to Solem and, indeed, all of the judgea who had considered 
this caae before Solem agreed that such language vaa aynonymous 
with diaestabliahment. See Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1303 
(panel opinion); IdL. at 1316 (Doyle, J., dissenting); and 521 
P.Supp. at 1122 (dlatrict court opinion). To the en banc major* 
lty, however, Solem altered this long-standing principle of 
interpretation and Barked a new direction in the Supreme Courtfs 
view of turn-of-the-century legislation concerning Indian reser-
vations. Thus, the en banc majority concluded that "[u)nder the 
Soles standards neither the Uncompahgre Reservation nor the 
Uintah Reservation has been disestablished or diminished by any 
of the congressional enactments in question1*. Ute Indian Tribe, 
773 F.2d at 1090-91. 
The majority's reading of Solem is not correct. Solem did 
not establish new "standards" and it did not alter the principles 
announced in Seymour, Mattz, DeCoteau and Rosebud, which the 
Court in Solem described as having "established a fairly clean 
0 
analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts 
that diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered 
non-Indians the opportunity to purchase lands within established 
reservation boundaries." 465 U.S. at 470. Although the Court 
has added several relevant factors to the traditional indicia of 
legislative intent, including how Congress and the Department of 
the Interior have treated the area in later years and whether the 
area has "lost its Indian character" because it is "predominately 
populated by non-Indians" (Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 & n.12), the 
Court has not departed from the governing principle "that con-
gressional intent will control" (Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586, and 
iolem, 465 U.S. at 470-71). 
In determining whether an Indian reservation exists, one must 
therefore first examine the face of the relevant legislation. 
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587* Zn each of the disestablishment cases 
decided before Solem, the Court expressly acknowledged that res-
toration to public domain constitutes firm and unequivocal lan-
guage of disestablishment. See Rosebud, 430 U.S. st 589 & n.5; 
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. st 426-27, 446; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504, n.22; 
Seymour, 368 U.S. st 354-55; and United States v. Pelican, 232 
U.S. 442, 445-46 (1914). In the clearest possible terms, the 
Court stated that restoration to the public domain meant 
"stripped of reservation status.11 DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446. 
The decisions in Rosebud and Decoteau fairly reflect the view 
of the Court on this point. Although in both cases the Court was 
divided on the question whether the particular area involved had 
retained reservation status, the Court was unanimous that such 
restoration language amounted to a unequivocal expression of an 
intent to disestablish. See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589, n.5; id. 
at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-27, 
446; id. st 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice 
Harshall--who wrote the Court's opinion in Solem—observed in his 
dissenting opinion in Rosebud that an 1889 surplus land act ex-
pressly restoring lands to the public domain (25 Stat. 896, sec. 
21) was "yet another example91 of "•clear language of express ter-
mination. . .f." Id^, 430 U.S. St 618. 
Solem did not reject or titer this firmly-established rule of 
interpretation. The crucial provision interpreted in Solem did 
not provide for the restoration of the surplus lands to the 
public domain, nor was any such language contained in the opera-
tive portions of the Solem legislation. Instead, s reference to 
"public domain" appeared in s subsequent section providing that 
tribal members could harvest timber on certain portions of the 
opened lands, •only as long as the land remained part of the 
public domain." Sec. 9, 35 Stat. 464. The Court acknowledged 
that even this oblique reference was evidence of disestablish-
ment; it found, however, that because the phrase was "isolated," 
it could not be dispositive. Solem, 465 U.S. at 475* 
In justifying its expansive interpretation of Solem, the en 
banc majority also relied upon a footnote in Solem stating that 
there was "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in 
using,.." public domain terminology in the Solera legislation 
since the affected lands "could be conceived of as being in the 
'public domain9 Inasmuch as they were available for settlement91 
(id,, 465 U.S. at 475, n.17). It is evident, however, that the 
Court did not intend this statement in Solem to overrule its 
prior decisions and to discount the significance of public domain 
language in every other instance. The Court had already indi-
cated that such language supported the disestablishment claim 
and, in any event, the Court would hardly have confined its com-
ments to one sentence in a footnote had it intended such a dras-
tic departure from the views, expressed by both the majority and 
dissenting Justices in prior cases, regarding the significance of 
such restoration language. 
The en banc majority's decision to the contrary also over* 
looks the Solem Court's later observation, in the context of 
subsequent jurisdictional history, that: 
Unentered lands were considered a part of the 
reservation. They were available for allotment to 
tribal members, they were leased for the benefit of 
the tribe, end they ysre specifically defined as 
different from land in public domain. 
Id. at 480, n.25 (emphasis added), quoting F. Hoxie, Jurisdiction 
on the Cheyenne River Reservation: An Analysis of the Causes and 
Consequences of the Act of May 29, 1908, at 87 (undated). The 
reference to public domain In the quoted passage can only be 
understood on the basis that public domain and reservation status 
are mutually exclusive.!£/ In short, Solem does not signal the 
Supreme Court's abandonment of its previous interpretations of 
restoration to public domain language. Such language continues 
to be the clearest expression of disestablishment. 
2. Although Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife v. 
Klamath Indian Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 3420 (1985),12/ required that the 
various acts Involved here--vhich contain identical operative 
language—should be interpreted to have the same effect, the en 
banc majority did not do so and thereby compounded its error. In 
this regard, there was no dispute that the so-called "Gilsonite 
16. This is how the author of the quoted study understood 
It, as he considered public domain status to be crucial in inter-
preting the subsequent jurisdictional treatment of the area in-
volved. See Hoxie, supra, at 87, 88. Thus, he stated that it 
was necessary to determine whether the area in question was "ad-
ministered as part of the public domain. . . .* Id., at 87. 
17. In that case, the issue was whether that Tribe retained 
treaty hunting and fishing rights in an area ceded under a 1901 
cession agreement. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422. In interpreting this 
agreement, the Court Initially looked to the construction given a 
prior treaty with the same Tribe containing similar cession Ian* 
guage. See 105 S.Ct. at 3422, 3428. As the Court there ex-
plained, *[p]reeumptively, the similar language used in the 1901 
Cession Agreement should have the same effect." 105 S.Ct. at 
3428. 
Strip"--* 7,000-ecre tract located on the edge of the original 
Uintah raaarvation—was diaaatabliahad by the Act of May 24, 1668 
(25 Stat. 157)• See, e.g., Uta Indian Tribe, 773 r.2d at 1098 
(Seymour, J., concurring). Compare with district court opinion, 
id.y 521 F.Supp. at 1099. See also panel opinion, id., 716 F.2d 
at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting). As Judge Seymour stated, "Con-
gress was completely clear when it terminated Uintah rights in 
the Cilsonite Strip. . . .* Id^, 773 F.2d at 1098. Yet the 
operative provisions concerning the Cilsonite Strip used the same 
language as the 1902 (Uintah) Surplus land Act and expressly re-
stored the area "to the public domain" (Section 1, 25 Stat. 157). 
The en banc majority offered no reason why the restoration lan-
guage contained In the 1902 Uintah Act should be interpreted dif-
ferently, and there is none.11/ 
3. The decision of the en banc majority is also at odds with 
the decisions of other courts of appeals in disestablishment 
cases. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, in a long line of deci-
sions, have consistently recognised that restoration to public 
domain language is an explicit expression of congressional intent 
to disestablish.!?/ Also, decisions of the Tenth Circuit prior 
18. The dissent, on the other hand, relied upon the under-
standing of the parties regarding the effect of the 1888 Act in 
interpreting the 1902 Surplus Land Act, as amended. See Ute 
Indian Tribe, 773 T.2& at 1112. 
19. See, e.g.. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Knelp, 521 F.2d 87, 90 
(8th Cir. 1975), affd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977)} United States ex 
rel. Feather v. Erickeon, 489 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom* DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 
U.S. 425 (1975); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 
F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973)1 Beardslee v. United States, 387 
to Solem had also assumed that such language vas synonymous with 
disestablishment.£Py The significance these decisions accorded 
to restoration to public domain language has a sound historical 
foundation and follows veil-established principles regarding 
public lands. See Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1106 (Seth, J., 
dissenting). Long before the acts in question here, it was set-
tled law that when the federal government appropriates or reser-
ves a tract for any purpose, such as an Indian reservation, the 
tract is thereby severed from the public domain—that is, it 
loses its status as public land.il/ In 1889, for instance, the 
19. (Cont'd.) F.2d 280, 285 (8th Cir. 1967); DeMarrias v. 
South Dakota, 319 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1963); Russ v. Wilkins, 
624 F.2d 914, 915, 924 6 927-29 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hoffman, J., 
dissenting), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); United States v. 
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 543 F.2d 676, 696 (9th Cir. 
1976). See also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South Dako-
ta, 711 F.2d 809, 817 n.8 (8th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 
1042 (1984); United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 525 F.2d 
120, 124 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); and 
Putnam v. United States, 248 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1957). 
District court and state court decisions in the disestablish-
ment context have been to the same effect. See, e.g., Puss v. 
Wilkins, 410 F.Supp. 579, 581-82 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other 
grounds, 624 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 908 
(1981); United States ex rel. Condon v."Trickson, 344 F.Supp. 
777, 778 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973); 
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F.Supp. 1001, 
1005 (D. Minn. 1971); Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117, 119 
(S.D. 1977); Wood v. Jameson, 130 N.W.2d 95, 99 (S.D. 1964); and 
Lafferty v. State, 125 N.W.2d 171, 174 (S.D. 1963). 
20. See Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir. 
1965); Toolsgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, 98, 104 (10th Cir. 
1950) (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
21. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 
(1839); Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston Railroad Co. v. 
United States, 92 U.S. 733, 745 (1875); Hastings and Dakota Rail-
road Co. V. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1889); Bardon v. 
Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 145 U.S. 535, 539 (1892); Spalding 
v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 404-05 (1896); Gibson v. Anderson, 131 
Supreme Court remarked that: 
The doctrine first announced in Wilcox and 
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, that a tract lawfully ap-
propriated to any purpose becomes thereafter sev-
ered from the mass of public lands . . • has been 
reaffirmed end applied by this court in such a 
great number and variety of cases that it may now 
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles 
underlying the land system of this country. 
Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co,, 132 U.S. at 360-61. Contrary 
to the en banc majorityfs view, because the reservation of a 
tract removed it from the public domain,11/ later restoration of 
the tract to the public domain firmly signified the end of reser-
vation status.12/ 
In sum, the en banc majority1* interpretation not only is 
inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the low-
er federal courts in Indian reservation boundary cases, but also 
21. (Contfd.) F. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1904); United States v. 
Techenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Ore. 1682); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. 
v. Atchison, Topeka t Santa Fe R. Co., 13 F. 106, 107 (D. Kan. 
1881); and United States v. Payne, 8 F. 883, 893-94 (W.D. Ark. 
1881). "Public domain" and "public lands" traditionally have 
been regarded as "equivalent" concepts. Barker v. Harvey, 181 
U.S. 481, 490 (1901). 
22. As the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior ex-
plained years later in regard to the original Uintah reservation, 
"(a)lthough the . . . reservation had been created out of the 
public domain, the land comprising it did not occupy the status 
of public domain land while included within the reservation. • . 
." Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 5 (December 7, 1950). 
23. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 
317 (1942). The issue in that case was whether the Sioux Tribe 
was entitled to compensation for certain lands reserved for it by 
executive orders but later "'restored to the public domain9 . . 
•"by the President. Id. at 325. In holding that no compensa-
tion was due, the Supreme Court expressly found that the two Ex-
ecutive Orders restoring the lands to the public domain (I Kap-
pler 884-85, 899) "terminated the reservation. . . ." Id. at 
330. 
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is untenable from an historical perspective. At the turn of the 
century, reservation status and public domain status vere uni-
formly understood to be mutually exclusive. In construing res-
toration language as it has, the Tenth Circuit has thus attempted 
to "remake history," which the Supreme Court admonished •'cannot" 
be done in order to resurrect a reservation that long ago ceased 
to exist. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; accord Rosebud, 430 U.S. et 
615. 
B. The Original Uintah Reservation was Disestablished 
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended, 
and Toc*ay is Comprised Only of the Trust Lands 
1. Governing Principles Support Disestablishment 
As discussed above, the en banc majority misread 
Solem as changing the Supreme Courtfs analytical test for deter-
mining reservation disestablishment, and failed to apply the 
proper test when considering the legislation which opened the 
Uintah reservation and restored the unallotted lands to the 
public domain. Restoration to public domain language constitutes 
firm and unequivocal language for disestablishment (DeCoteau, 420 
U.S. at 445-46), and demonstrates "an unmistakable baseline pur-
pose of disestablishment91 (Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 592). 
The analysis of the "public domain" language in the 1902 Act 
as amended by subsequent acts Is a key part of the analysis to 
determine whether or not the reservation was disestablished. The 
en banc majority did not consider this legislation in a manner 
consistent with relevant precedents, while the en banc dissent 
followed the correct analytical test and reached the correct 
result. Subsection 2 below is an analysis of the legislation 
opening the reservation. It clearly shows s congressional intent 
to restore the surplus lands to the public domain and dises-
tablish the reservation. 
After disregarding clear language of disestablishment on the 
basis of its misreading of Solem, the en banc majority proceeded 
to ignore other factors that must be considered not only under 
Solem but also under the Supreme Court's prior decisions. Sum-
marizing these decisions, the Court in Solem stated that when the 
area involved "has long since lost its Indian character, we have 
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have 
occurred. . . ." 465 U.S. at 471. Thus, "who actually moved 
onto opened reservation lands is . . . relevant to deciding 
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. . . ." Id. 
By focusing all its attention on Solem and treating it as 
setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself 
to the teachings of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions. In 
addition to the statutory language, "the 'surrounding circum-
stances,1 and the 'legislative history9 are to be examined" in 
Interpreting surplus land enactments. Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 5B7. 
Accord, s.q., Solem, 465 U.S. mt 469-70. The rscord hare demon-
strates that the en banc majority did not consider these factors 
in a manner consistent with the relevant precedents. Subsection 
3 below reviews these other relevant factors. They vividly dem-
onstrate that the decision below will not materially advance the 
interests of tribal sovereignty, and will severely hamper the 
functioning of State and local governments. 
We now turn to a specific discussion of the legislation, 
legislative history, demographics and other circumstances sur-
rounding the opening of the Uintah reservation. 
2. The Uintah Reservation vas Disestablished Pursuant 
to the Act of May 27, 1902, as amended 
a. Creation of the Uintah Reservation 
The Uintah reservation vas created by President 
Abraham Lincoln by Executive Order in 1861 and included the en-
tire area vithin the drainage basin of the Duchesne River, com-
prising approximately 2,039,040 acres (about 3,186 square miles). 
This vas later confirmed by Congress in 1864 (13 Stat. 63). The 
various bands of the Ute Tribe vere encouraged to move to the 
Uintah reservation so they vould finally be settled in a desig-
nated area. See Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp. at 1092-1100, tor 
a discussion of the creation and early history of the Uintah 
reservation. 
b. Early Efforts to Restore Surplus Reservation 
Lands to the Public Domain—The 1902 Act 
The period around the turn of the century vit-
nessed an active effort by Congress and the President to dises-
tablish large Indian reservations by making individual allotments 
to the Indians and then restoring the remaining lands to the 
public domain for settlement. This, Congress hoped, vould 
facilitate the assimilation of Indians into the general society. 
The Uintah reservation vas not the only reservation vhere the 
allotment and surplus program vas instigated; it vas happening in 
several other reservations in the West at about the same time 
period. See Ceneral Allotment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388); DeCo-
teau at 432*33; and Solem at 466-67. 
The Uintah reservation contained vast areas of land in excess 
of the lands needed to satisfy the allotments to the Indians. 
Therefore, Congress enacted the Act of Kay 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 
245), which was the Indian Appropriations Act for that year, and 
included a provision restoring any lands not allotted to the 
Indians to the public domain. The relevant portion of the Act 
states: 
That the Secretary of the Interior, with the 
consent thereto of the majority of the adult male 
Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of 
Ute Indians, be ascertained as soon as practicable 
by an Inspector, shall cause to be allotted to each 
head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land 
which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land 
to each other member of said tribes, said allot-
ments to be made prior to October first, nineteen 
hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted 
lands within said reservation shall be restored to 
the public domain: ". • • (Emphasis added) • 
Thus, the original 1902 Act authorizing the opening of the reser-
vation contained •'public domain99 language which is language "pre-
cisely suited" to disestablishment. DeCoteau, supra, at 445-446. 
Again, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Knelp, 430 U.S. 5B4 (1977), the 
Supreme Court held that language restoring surplus reservation 
land to the public domain (even though the original act was amen-
ded to provide for a different method of opening) demonstrated 
•an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment." Id. at 
392. See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
An Important observation is that, in 1902, Congress believed 
the consent of the Indians had to be obtained before their lands 
could be allotted and the surplus restored to the public domain 
and thus opened to private settlement and entry under the public 
land laws. Efforts to obtain the consent of the Indians to al-
lotment were unsuccessful within the time limits met forth in the 
1902 Act and Congress was forced to take further action with 
regard to opening the Uintah reservation. However, this task was 
made easier by the Supreme Court's decision in Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which held that Congress had ex-
clusive and plenary power to deal with reservation lands, without 
the necessity of obtaining the approval or consent of the 
Indians. 
c. Action After the 1902 Act 
Reacting to the latitude confirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Lone Wolf, supra, Congress promptly enacted the Act of 
March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 982), which directed that the Uintah 
reservation should be allotted and the surplus lands opened for 
settlement and entry under the public land laws.ll/ In 1904 Con-
gress again extended the time for the opening to March 10, 1905, 
so that surveying could be completed and allotments made (33 
Stat. 207). 
In the meantime, on April 27, 1903, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs prepared instructions for United States Indian 
Inspector James McLaughlin regarding the opening of the Uintah 
24. It is worthy of note that it took Congress fewer than 
sixty days following the decision of the Supreme Court In Lone 
Wolf in which to mandate the opening of the Uintah reservation 
without the consent of the Indians. 
_ %#i — 
reeervation. The Department of Interior viewed the adminietra-
tiva teak under tha 1903 Act to ba ona of leaking allotments to 
tha Indiana and raatoration of tha aurplua lands to tha public 
domain aa sat forth in the 1902 Act. In Kay of 1903, Inspector 
McLaughlin met vith the Utes in the Uinta Basin to explain to 
them that the reservation was to be terminated without their con-
aent and that allotments would be Bade. The following extract 
from the transcript of that meeting clearly shows McLaughlin's 
underatanding that the reaervation boundaries were to be extin-
guished (JX 162, pg. 42): 
Inspector McLaughlin: 
A number of your speakers have said that you do 
not want your land stolen from you. My friends, 
these hills, these streams, these valleys will all 
remain just as they are. There will be no change 
in the nature of the country but the improvements 
that will come when white people come in among you. 
My friends, Red Cap said my talk was cloudy, and 
you do not understand it. You are the people who 
are in the dark in regard to the force of this act 
of congress, and I am trying to bring you into the 
light. You say that line is very heavy and that 
the reservation is nailed down upon the border~ 
That Is very true as applying to the past many 
years and up to now, but congress has provided 
legislation which will pull up the nails which hold 
down that line and after next year there will be no 
outside boundary line to this reservation. (Em-
phasis added) .«/ 
d. Tha Act of March 3, 1905 
Tha time set by tha 1904 Act for opening the 
reservation (March 10, 1905) was running out. Early in 1905, the 
25. For a mora detailed version of McLaughlin's negotiations 
with the Indiana, see JX 162, pp. 42*45. A subsequent report of 
McLaughlin, summarizing his meetings with the Utaa, can be found 
at LD 101, pp. 9-12. 
Department of Interior had not been able to complete surveys of 
reservation land In order to make the allotments, mo that the 
excess lands could in turn be ascertained and restored to the 
public domain. This delay prompted the Senate, on February 4, 
1905, to demand an explanation from the Secretary of the Interior 
as to vhy he apparently was not going to meet the March 10 dead-
line (see ID 101 at p. 1). The Secretary reported promptly, 
under date of February 15, 1905, setting forth the progress that 
had been made, and explaining, inter alia, that the Department 
had experienced difficulty in completing land surveys so that 
allotments could be made and this had prevented a timely comple-
tion of the allotment program. He thus made clear the need for 
en extension of time in which to complete the allotment program. 
Accordingly, by the Act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1048), 
Congress extended the effective date for terminating the reserva-
tion from March 10, 1905, to September 1, 1905. The Act provided 
in relevant part: 
That the said unallotted lands, excepting such 
tracts es may have been set aside as national 
forest reserve, end such mineral lands as were dis-
posed of by the ect of Congress of May twenty-
seventh, nineteen hundred and two, shall be dis-
posed of under the general provisions of the home-
stead end town-site laws of the United States, end 
shall be opened to settlement end entry by procla-
mation of the President, which proclamation shall 
prescribe the manner in which these lands may be 
mettled upon, occupied, end entered by persons en-
titled to make entry thereof; • • • 
That before the opening of the Uintah Indian Reser-
vation the President is hereby authorized to met 
apart end reserve as an addition to the Uintah 
Forest Reserve, subject to the laws, rules, end 
regulations governing forest reserves, end subject 
to the mineral rlghte granted by the ect of Con-
gress of Kay twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred end 
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two, such portions of the lands within the Uintah 
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and 
he may also set apart and reserve any reservoir 
site or other lands necessary to conserve and pro-
tect the water supply for the Indians or for 
general agricultural development, and may confirm 
such rights to water thereon as have already ac-
crued: Provided, That the proceeds from any timber 
on such addition as may with safety be sold prior 
to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty, 
shall be paid to said Indians in accordance with 
the provisions of the act opening the reservation. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
e. The Relationship Between the 1902 and 1905 Acts 
The en banc majority thought the 1905 Act (33 
Stat. 1069), extending the time for opening, supplanted the 1902 
Act (32 Stat. 263), restoring the lands to the public domain. 
Compare Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089 with id. at 1111-12 
(Seth, J., dissenting). That reasoning is flawed and is not sup-
ported by the Acts, the legislative history or surrounding 
circumstances. 
It is true that the 1905 Act does not specifically repeat the 
"public domain" language of the 1902 Act. Rather, the 1905 Act 
contained a provision that the unallotted lands were to be dis-
posed of under "the general provisions of the homestead and town-
site laws, . . . and shall be opened to settlement and entry by 
proclamation of the President." But the 1905 Act did not purport 
to change whether there should be a disestablishment. That had 
already been clearly stated in the 1902 Act. The 1905 Act merely 
addressed the manner and procedures for accomplishing dises-
tablishment. There is no conflict or Inconsistency between the 
two. 
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The provision in the 1905 Act that the surplus lands were to 
be disposed of under the homestead and tovnsits provisions of the 
public land lavs certainly does not constitute s restriction to 
the declaration in the 1902 Act that the lands were to be re-
stored to the public domain. The intent of the 1902 Act vas car-
ried over into the 1905 Act. 
The circumstances surrounding the Uintah reservation opening 
are similar in many respects to those in Rosebud, supra, vhere 
the Supreme Court found there to be a diminishment of reservation 
boundaries. In Rosebud, the Court held that the operative lan-
guage of the original act demonstrated "an unmistakable baseline 
purpose of disestablishment" (430 U.S. at 592) sven though the 
opening of the reservation vas actually implemented by subsequent 
legislation. The same is true for the Uintah reservation legis-
lation in that each later act merely builds on the original act 
and deals primarily with extending the time for opening.26/ 
The legislative history of the 1905 Act, hovever, demon-
strates that Congress vas implementing, not abandoning, the 1902 
Act's baseline purpose to and the Uintah reservation. Compare S. 
Rep. No. 4240, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., St 14-16 (1905) (letters of 
the Commissioners of Indian Affairs and the General Land Office) 
vith Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112 (Seth, J., dissenting) 
("[n]othing in the Congressional debates suggests an attempt to 
26. On this point, the Tenth Circuitfs an banc decision is 
contrary to its vievs as expressed in Hanson v. U.S.# 153 F.2d 
162 (10th Cir. 1946), vhere it vas concluded that the 1905 Act 
merely extended the date of opening and did not alter or affect 
the operative terms of the 1902 Act. 
change the 1902 intent. • • * ) . See also, debates at 39 Cong. 
Fee. 1181-1185, 3522 (Jan. 21, 1905, LD 103). 
What Congress was actually concerned about in 1905 (other 
than e speedy conclusion of the allotment process) was that land 
speculators might deprive bona-fide homesteaders of the land. 
See "Indian Appropriations Bill, 1906," Hearings, Subcomm. of the 
Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905, LD 
100 at 30). Nowhere in the cited subcommittee debates is there 
any statement that the purpose of the limitations on entry was to 
keep the reservation intact* To the contrary, the pertinent dis-
cussion reveals that even with such limitations the land would 
still be restored to the public domain. Senator Teller, one of 
the advocates of the limitation on entry stated at the hearings: 
"I am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land 
if I can help it" (Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra, LD 100 at 
30) (emphasis added). Further, there is nothing in the congres-
sional debates or reports to indicate that Congress ever intended 
or desired to preserve the original exterior boundary of the Uin-
tah reservation. 
The real purpose end intent of the 1905 Act was not only to 
implement the restoration of the surplus lands to the public do-
main as provided in the 1902 Act, but also to allow entry and 
settlement of such lands only under the homestead and townsite 
laws in order to prevent speculation. Limitations on entry such 
as those contained in the 1905 Act ere not inconsistent with the 
previously expressed intent of Congress to restore surplus lands 
to the public domain end disestablish the reservation. Again, 
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the cumulative series of sets in this case can be compared to 
those in Rosebud where the Supreme Court held there to be a 
disestablishment. Rosebud at 592. 
That the 1905 Act carried the 1902 Act into effect is further 
clearly demonstrated by the Presidential Proclamation opening the 
original Uintah reservation for entry and settlement. The Presi-
dential Proclamation of July 14, 1905 (34 Stat. 3119), employing 
much the same format as that used in the 1904 Rosebud Proclama-
tion, provided: 
Whereas it was provided by the Act of Congress, 
approved May 27, • • • 1902 (32 Stat., 263), among 
other things, that on October first, 1903, the un-
allotted lands in the Uintah Indian Reservation, in 
the State of Utah, "shall be restored to the public 
domain; • • . ." 
And, whereas, the time for the opening of said 
unallotted lands was extended to October 1, 1904, 
by the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1903 (32 
Stat., 998), and was extended to March 10, 1905, by 
the Act of Congress approved April 21, 1904 (33 
Stat., 207), and was again extended to not later 
than September 1, 1905, by the Act of Congress, 
approved March 3, 1905 (33 Stat-, 1069), which last 
named act provided, among other things: 
[The Act is here quoted] 
Mow, therefore, I . . . do hereby declare . . . 
that all the unallotted lands in said reservation, 
excepting such as have at that time been reserved 
. . ., and such mineral lands as may have been 
disposed of . . ., will on and after the 28th day 
of August, 1905, in the manner hereinafter pre-
scribed, and not otherwise, be opened to entry, 
settlement, and disposition under the general pro-
visions of the homestead and townsite laws of the 
United States. . . . 
34 Stat, at 3119-20 (emphasis added). 
The President thus clearly understood that the 1905 Act was 
implementing—not deviating from—the purpose of disestablishment 
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underlying the 1902 Act. The 1905 Proclamation le similar to the 
one involved in Roeebud end conetitutee en "unambiguous, contem-
poraneous, statement, by the Nation's Chief Executive of a per-
ceived disestablishment. • ,» (Id., 430 U.S. at 602-03), and 
unmistakably reflecte the intent of Congress. See id. at 603. 
On this subject the en banc majority opinion is again silent. 
3. Additional Considerations Support Disestablishment 
In addition to examining the legislation opening a 
reservation, the Supreme Court has stated that another component 
of its "fairly clean analytical structure" is to examine the 
subsequent history of the area: 
On a more pragmatic level, ve have recognized 
that vho actually moved onto opened reservation 
lands is also relevant to deciding whether a 
surplus land act diminished a reservation. Where 
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion 
of a reservation and the area has long since lost 
its Indian character, ve have acknowledged that de 
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have oc-
curred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra, 
at 5B8, n 3, and 604*605, 51 L Ed 2d 660, 97 S Ct 
1361; Decoteau v. District County Court, 429 US at 
428, 43 L Ed 2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082. In addition to 
the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to 
de facto diminishment, ve look to the subsequent 
demographic history of opened lands as one addi-
tional clue as to vhat Congress expected vould hap* 
pen once land on a particular reservation vas 
opened to non-Indian settlers. 
Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 
The Court further noted that: 
When an area is predominately populated by non-
Indians vith only e few surviving pockets of Indian 
allotmente, finding that the land remains Indian 
Country seriously burdens the administration of 
State and local governments. 
Solem at 471, n.12. 
I n
 Roaebud, the Court stated: 
The fact that naithar Congrees nor tha Depart-
Bant of Indian Affaira haa aought to axarciaa its 
authority ovar thia area, or to challanga tha 
State's axarciae of authority, ia a factor antitled 
to vaight aa a part of tha "jurisdictional his-
tory." The long-standing assumption of jurisdic-
tion by the State over an araa that ia over 90% 
non-Indian, both in population and in land use, not 
only demonstrates the parties9 understanding of the 
meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable 
expectations which should not be upset by ao 
strained a reading of the Acts. • . 
Rossbud, 430 U.S. at 604-05. We will now briefly examine several 
additional factora which strongly support disestablishment. 
a. Subsequent Administrative and Congressional 
Recognition of Termination 
The 1905 Presidential Proclamation, discussed 
supra, which opened the reservation, does not stand alone in its 
reference that the surplus lands were restored to the public do-
Bain. The understanding of other responsible government offi-
cials has, until recent years, consistently mirrored President 
Roosevelt's construction.12/ Many of the documents cited in the 
27• See, e.g., Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to the Secretary of Interior, dated May 11, 1905, at 3 
(JX 463); Letter of the Acting Secretary of Interior, dated Sep-
tember 3, 1909; Letter of the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office to Senator Reed Smoot, dated December 20, 1909; Letter of 
the Secretary of Interior to Senator Reed Smoot, dated January 
12, 1911; H.R. Doc. No. 892, 62d Cong., 2d Seas., at 1-2 (1912) 
(Joint Report of Inspector James McLaughlin and the Chief Super-
visor) ; H.R. Doc. No. 1250, 63d Cong., 3d Sees., at 1-2 (1914) 
(Letter of the Secretary); Letter of the Commissioner of the 
Canaral Land Office to the Commissioner of Indian Affaira, dated 
September 26, 1922, at 1 (JX 403); Letter of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, dated December 1, 1927, at 2; 54 I.D. 559, 561-62 
(1934) (JX 431); Solicitor Opinion M-33626, at 2 (Auguat 3, 
1944); Secretarial Order, 10 Fed. Reg. 12409 (1945) (LD 183); 59 
2.D. 393 (1947); Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 1-2, 5 (December 
7, 1950); Appeal of Edward M. Brown, A-26523, at 1-2 (December 
margin expressly recognire that, vith respect to the original 
Uintah reservation, the unallotted and unreserved lands were re-
stored to the public domain under the provisions of the 1902 Act. 
The record shows as veil that officials of the Interior Depart-
ment treated the original Uintah reservation as having been 
disestablished. Thus, with the opening of the reservation in 
1905, Department officials immediately began referring to the 
original area as the "former" reservation. For decades after the 
opening, Interior officials consistently administered only the 
trust lends (the tribal grazing reserve, the allotments, and the 
lands later restored to tribal ownership and reservation status) 
as the Tribe's existing reservation,28/
 a practice that continued 
until recently.il/ 
27. (Cont'd.) 11, 1952); Appeal of Charles B. Consales, at 1 
(January 23, 1953); and Secretarial Order, 36 Fed. Reg. 19920 
(1971) (LD 210). 
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 5010, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 
1-2 (1906) (Letters of Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs); Presidential Proclamation dated September 1, 
1906, 34 Stat. 3228; Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, dated September 26, 1907, at 1 (JX 336); Letter of the 
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, dated November 8, 1907, at 1 (JX 338); H.R. Doc. 
No. 1279, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-3 (1909) (1908 Letters of 
Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Letter of the 
Secretary of Interior, dated December 19, 1908, at 1, 2, 4 4 6 
(JX 341); and 39 I.D. 79 (1910) (Acting Secretary of Interior). 
See also 34 I.D. 549, 549-50 (1906) (Ass't. Attorney General). 
29. See, e.g., 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth J., dissenting); S. 
Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the 
Secretary of the Interior); 1929 Annual Report of the Uintah & 
Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 420); 1931 Agency Crazing Report, at 1, 3 
(JX 424); 1931 Annual Agency Report, at 4 (JX 425); 1932 Annual 
Agency Report, at 1 (JX 427); H.R. Rep. No. 370, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess., at 3 (1941) (Report submitted by Secretary of Interior); 
Phoenix Area Office, Information Profiles of Indian Reservations 
In Arizona, Nevada t Utah, at 155 (1976) (JX 480). 
Subsequent legislation and other congressional materials are 
to the ease effect.12/ Numerous congressional documents subse-
quent to the 1905 opening contain references to the "former" 
reservation. See for example, Senate Report No. 219, 61st Cong. 
2d Sess., Feb. 14, 1910 (LD 138) entitled "Making Available Lands 
On Former Uintah Indian Reservation," (emphasis added).11/ 
It should be noted that these numerous and repeated referen-
ces in congressional documents were consistent with the policy of 
the day of disestablishing Indian reservations and assimilating 
the Indians into society. 
30. See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1912, 37 Stat. 196; S. Rep. 
No. 139, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); H.R. Rep. No. 291, 
59th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1906); S. Rep. No. 893, 62d Cong., 
2d Sess., at 1*2 (1912); H.R. Rep. No. 943, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 
at 1-2 (1912); S. Rep. No. 979, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1-2 
(1926); H.R. Rep. No. 2047, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1927); 
and 74 Cong. Rec. 3408 (1931). Characteristic of Congress1 
treatment is the Act of July 20, 1912, which provided that: 
any person who has heretofore made a homestead entry for 
land which was formerly a part of the Uintah Indian 
Reservation in the State of Utah, authorized by the Act 
approved May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and two, 
and Acts amendatory thereto. . . . 
37 Stat. 196 (emphasis added). See also Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 
603, n.25. 
31. For other past tense references to the "former" reserva-
tion, see: Congressional Floor Debates, Jan. 15, 1906, p. 1064 
(LD 116); Senate Bill 321, Jan. 27, 1906 (LD 120); H.R. Rep. No. 
823, Feb. 9, 1906 (LD 122); 6. Rep. No. 2561—Indian Appropria-
tions Bill, p. 131, April 13, 1906 (LD 124); S. Rep. No. 4263, 
June 12, 1906 (LD 126); Public Lav 258 (H.R. 15331, pp. 375*76) 
June 21, 1906 (LD 127)} H.R. Rap. No. 5010, June 25, 1906 (LD 
128); Senate Bill 6375 (P.L. 345) June 29, 1906 (LD 129); P.L. 
104—Indian Appropriations Bill, p. 95, April 30, 1908 (LD 135); 
P.L. 144—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 285, April 4, 1910 (LD 
139); P.L. 434—Indian Appropriations Act, p. 1074, Kerch 31, 
1911 (LD 141); P.L. 717, 70 Stat. 546, 548, July 14, 1956 (LD 
203). 
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Judicial pronouncements also follow suit. In decisions ren-
dered prior to Ute Indian Trlbef the courts interpreted the 1905 
Act as merely amending, not superseding, the 1902 Act.ll/ In-
deed, in 1946, the Tenth Circuit expressly held in Hanson v. 
United States—a decision unaccountably ignored by the en banc 
majority--that the unalloted and unreserved lands of the original 
Uintah reservation vere "restored to the public domain by the Act 
of May 27, 1902. . . ." Id. at 163. The Utah Supreme Court 
likewise recognized the restoration of the unallotted lands to 
the public domain under these Acts. Sovards, 108 P. at 1114. 
Finally, in a different context, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that the Tribe's reservation vas considered to be only 
those lands held in trust by the federal government. Affiliated 
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972). 
Moreover, by holding that the original Uintah reservation 
remains intact, the en banc majority has created vhat must be one 
of the fev—if not the only—Indian reservations engulfing a na-
tional forest. The district court and the panel of the court of 
appeals agreed that such an anomaly vas not intended and that the 
forest provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048, 
1069*70, vhich set aside more than 1 million acres •as an addi-
tion to the Uintah Forest reserve, subject to the lavs, rules and 
regulations governing forest reserves,11 thereby diminished the 
32. See Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d at 162-63; Uintah 
and White~Rlver Bands of Ute Indians, 139 Ct.Cl. at 5-6 ft 21-22; 
United States v. Boss, 160 P. 132, 132-33 (D. Utah 1906); and 
Sovards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910). 
original Uintah reservation. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1313-
14. The en banc majority thought, incorrectly, that under SoleTn 
the transfer of the administration of these one million acres 
from the Interior Department to the Department of Agriculture and 
the fact that Congress later compensated the Tribe for its inter-
est in the forest lands were not inconsistent with continued 
reservation status. Despite the fact, as the federal district 
court stated, that the "status and purpose of national forest 
lands are distinct from the status and purpose of Indian reserva-
tions" (Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F.Supp at 1138), the en banc 
majority apparently believed that under Solem this could be ig-
nored and that the Tribe therefore had jurisdiction within the 
national forest (Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090). There is, 
however, nothing in the Courtfs Solem opinion that justifies such 
an extraordinary result. Congress clearly ended the original 
Uintah reservation on the land withdrawn for a national forest, 
which further demonstrates its intent to disestablish the reser-
vation itself. 
The United States supported the Ute Tribe as amicus curiae in 
the recent federal litigation with respect to the Uintah reserva-
tion. In so doing, the United States failed to acknowledge the 
inconsistency of that position with its position in other litiga-
tion involving this reservation. In Uintah and White River Bands 
of Ute Indians v. United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 1 (1957), it entered 
into a stipulation with which the Court of Claims agreed (139 
Ct.Cl. at 5*6, 22) which quoted the 1902 Act end then succinctly 
stated the critical point: •Pursuant to this [1902] Act and 
amendments thereto, • . • allotments in severalty . . . . were 
made to the Uintah and White River Indians, and surplus lands . . 
. . vere restored to the public domain, and opened for disposi-
tion under the public land lavs for the benefit of the Indians11 
(emphasis added). What is more, the United States (and the Utes) 
consistently and repeatedly maintained that the original Uintah 
reservation vas a former reservation; and throughout its opinion 
and findings, the Court of Claims also treated the original Uin-
tah reservation as having ended. E.g., 139 Ct.Cl. at 2, 25, 28f 
56, 64, 69 and 70. It is also worthy of note that when the Ute 
Indian plaintiffs appeared in the Court of Claims, they summed it 
up veil: "Nov, the Act of May 27, 1902, comes as a matter of 
particular importance in this suit because that is the Act as 
amended under which the Uintah Reservation was ultimately broken 
up."22/ 
b. Subsequent Demographic History Supports 
Disestablishment 
Here, the demographic history of the area demon-
strates that the en banc majority's decision will not materially 
advance the interests of tribal sovereignty (which has for the 
past 60 years been exercised primarily on the trust lands), but 
will seriously hamper the functioning of State and local govern-
ments in a myriad of areas. The disputed area "lost its Indian 
character" long ago. It is "predominantly populated by non-
33. Opening statement in testimony for plaintiff, Uintah and 
White River Band of Utes v. U.S., Ho. 47569, U.S. Court of Claims 
at p. 195 (Jan. 11, 1954). 
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Indiana,•» approximately 18,000 of than,11/ with only about 1,500 
tribal members, who are living mainly on trust lands. Ute Indian 
Tribe, 773 r.2d at 1105 (Seth, J.# dissenting). The non-Indians 
are the ones "who actually moved onto the opened reservation 
lands" and have been there ever since. Thus, there has indeed 
been a de facto or de jure disestablishment. It is their "jus-
tifiable expectations," built up over a 60-year period, that 
would be upset if it were to be held that the original boundaries 
are still intact and it la their interests the en banc majority 
ignored, despite the United States Supreme Court's command that 
such factors must be taken into account. E.g., Rosebud, 430 U.S. 
at 605; and Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 
Under the en banc majorityfs result, the Ute Tribe would pre-
side over an area owned and predominantly populated by non-
Indians and, hence, in which the Tribe has little presence and no 
real interest as a sovereign. At the same time, State and local 
authority would be significantly limited despite the fact that 
this area has principally been the concern and responsibility of 
these governments, not the Tribe. This would include Increased 
tribal court jurisdiction over all residents of the area, and 
diminished state court jurisdiction. 
The testimony and exhibits Introduced in the federal district 
court clearly establish that the State and its local governmental 
divisions had exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic 
34. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, General 
Population Characteristics Utah, Table 15, p. 46-12 (1980). 
reservation area subsequent to the opening, except on the trust 
lands. The early jurisdictional history of the disputed area 
shows that the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Agency (the White 
River, Uintah and Uncompahgre Utes) were, after the historic 
reservation was opened to settlement, generally subject to the 
lavs of the State of Utah within those areas so opened (excluding 
trust lands).11/ For example, in the Annual Report of the Super-
intendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency for 1916 (JX 3B0), it 
was stated as follows: 
The Indians of this Jurisdiction are citizens of 
the State of Utah, and voters, and the present 
Superintendent has not assumed any jurisdiction 
over their persons. Where offences have been corn-
Bitted against the lavs of the State, the natter 
has been reported to the County authorities and the 
agency officials have endeavored to co-operate with 
the County authorities in the maintenance of lav 
and order. 
Id. at 2-3. Other documentary evidence also demonstrates that 
the State exercised jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area beginning in the early 1900*i.21/ 
The primary evidence regarding the more recent jurisdictional 
history of the disputed area was the testimony of various State 
and local officials introduced at the federal district court tri-
al. This testimony shows that until recently the State continued 
*5. See, e.g., JX 344; JX 354 at 2-3; JX 368 at 2-3; JX 380 
at 2} JX 366 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4; JX 396; JX 397 at 2; JX 399 
at 2i JX 412 at 1; JX 415 at 1-3; JX 417 at 1-2; and JX 420. 
36. See also letter from District Superintendent, Indian 
Field Service, August 5, 1926 (JX 412); Annual Report of the 
Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, 1917 and 1918; JX 
386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4. See also Trial Tr. at 269 and 277-78 
(testimony of Ceorge Karett, Sheriff of Duchesne County). 
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to exercise primary jurisdiction vithln the historic reservation 
area, except on the trust lands.22/ 
The evidence introduced in this case regarding the exercise 
of jurisdictional authority by the Tribe also confirms that the 
State and local governmental subdivisions have, until recently, 
exercised primary jurisdiction within the historic reservation 
area, except on the trust lands.ll/ 
Finally, until recently the Ute Tribe itself treated only the 
trust lands as the Tribe's post-1905 reservation.11/ A3 the dis-
sent in Ute Indian Tribe observed: 
Statements made by the Utes themselves also tend to de-
tract from their position. For example, the 1957 Ute 
Ten Year Development Program provides a description of 
the total acreage of the Uintah and Ouray reservation as 
currently containing 1,010,000 acres. . . . 
773 F.2d at 1114. 
37. See Trial Tr. at 106 (testimony of Clair Huff, Utah Di-
vision of Wildlife Resources); 121 (testimony of Norman Hancock, 
Division of Wildlife Resources); 158-59 (testimony of David 
Thomas, Division of Wildlife Resources); 186-87 (testimony of 
Edward Tuttle, Utah Division of Parks and Recreation); 220 (tes-
timony of Donald Smith, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources); 251 
(testimony of C. Blake Felght, Utah Division of Oil, Gas & 
Mining); 267, 270-74, 277-79 and 281-89 (testimony of George 
Marett, Duchesne County Sheriff); and 298-99 (testimony of Ray 
Wardle, member and Chief of Tribal Police, cross-deputized by 
Uintah County). 
38. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 121 and 135 (testimony of Norman 
Hancock); 159 (testimony of David Thomas); 174 (testimony of Gor-
don Harmston, Utah Department of Natural Resources); 187 (tes-
timony of Edward Tuttle); 228 (testimony of Charles East); 251 
(testimony of C. Blake Feight); 262-63 (testimony of Alfred Par-
riette, Tribefs Division of Wildlife Management and Lav Enforce-
ment)} end 294-300 (testimony of Ray Wardle). 
39. See, e.g., 1957 Ute Ten-Year Development Program, at 66-
68 (JX 465); 1966 Review and Revision of the Uintah & Ouray 
Indian Reservation-Wide Program, et 7, 8; and 1969 Annual Report 
of the Uintah Indian Tribe, at 1 (JX 473). 
Further, for many decades the Ute Tribe has maintained signs 
at the boundaries of the trust lands, advising the public that 
they vere entering the "Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.91 
These signs vere clearly intended to designate vhat the Tribe 
thought vere the reservation boundaries. The signs have been 
replaced from time to time over the years (vith the signs in more 
recent times being more elaborate), but they have always indi-
cated that the boundaries of the trust lands vere the reservation 
boundaries. £2/ 
In short, the record is clear that until recent years the 
Tribe never attempted to exert any significant jurisdictional 
authority off the trust lands. The history of the area in dis-
pute shows that it has long been the responsibility of State and 
local governments, is overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians, 
and has lost Its Indian character virtually from the opening of 
the reservation in 1905. 
Applying the analytical test developed by the United States 
Supreme Court to the legislation, facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the opening of the original Uintah reservation, the con-
clusion must be that the reservation vas disestablished and the 
surplus lands vhlch vere restored to the public domain are not 
part of the reservation—nor do they constitute Indian country as 
40. See, for example, the testimonies of Dave Thomas (Tr. 
155*5?) end Cordon Karmston (Tr. 176-77)• A series of photo-
grapha of such signs located at trust land boundaries, as such 
signs appeared on Kerch 22, 1977, vere introduced at trial as Ex. 
I-4B, coordinated vith Ex. I-4A, indicating the precise locations 
vhere the various photographs vere taken. 
defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151. Therefore, the state district court 
had jurisdiction in this matter. 
